Embracing The Future Of Human Factors Training

There has long been a paradox in Human Factors (HF) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) training interventions- how do you recreate the 'live' scenarios you're trying to teach? Replicating specific conditions associated with Human Factors is very challenging for a trainer, furthermore replicating the emotions nearly impossible. For a long time we (HBP-Training) have believed that a HF approach to training can reach farther than the prevention of accidents, it can be used as the primary vehicle for team development, leadership & management training, stress awareness training and employee engagement. When examined, the different elements that comprise the full spectrum of HF are all closely linked and very much influenced and coerced by human behaviour and emotion. After all it is the liveware interface with it's surrounding components that is the fundamental basis of understanding how accidents, incidents and near misses arise and more importantly to our organisation, how they don't.

Maersk Immersive Training Simulator

With this in mind, any technology which enhances and improves the delivery of training should be embedded within the fabric of HF & CRM delivery. For some time now aviation has used hi-tech simulators to accelerate pilot performance and development, other industries are following such as Oil & gas with Maersk Training amongst others (above). There is, however, a disconnect in this technology, a void in which HF & CRM have so far found themselves entrapped. There are two reasons the current technology does not lend itself to HF delivery. The first is the nature of the technology is specific to individual roles although I acknowledge it can be adapted if needed. This makes it a fantastic tool for a very specific demographic, i.e. pilots in aviation. The second problem lies in the transferability of such technologies. These fixed immersive units, although magnificent and expensive in equal measures, do not lend itself to the ubiquitous nature of HF & CRM training. Perhaps the Human Factors solution with immersive training technology lies in the middle ground?

We believe that accessibility and mobility are the key components to really accelerate the capability of immersive training in HF delivery - whether in aviation, oil & gas, healthcare or even the financial sector.

Such technology exists in the form of MDT Global Solutions Immersive Simulator which is a fully portable projector enabling set up in any classroom environment with three available walls. This capability adds a further dimension to the delivery of such training interventions, it enables 'live' moment-to-moment decisions and generates the opportunity and also perspective for delegates to watch incidents unfold - and most importantly offers an influence on different outcomes. There is another benefit of this technology, it can be used to record the fixed and expensive immersive assist to then transport and project to a wider demographic. We now have the ability to discuss certain areas of Human Factors or even specific case studies, then bring the scenario alive with this technology.

This now takes us to the next generation of Human Factors and Crew Resource Management delivery....

 

Can You Multitask?

I was once walking while concurrently texting, a common multitask I would suggest? While walking, and although believing my judgement not impaired, I collided with a young boy knocking him to the ground. I’m sure you can imagine my guilt and embarrassment while profusely apologising to the mother of the young boy – she called me an idiot, she was right.

Consequence is a topic that is routinely discussed within Human Factors, often there is little perceived consequence with many of our routine actions. During my texting incident I would of made unconscious calculations and assumptions to predict the likely outcome of my walk, these are known as heuristics. My unconscious brain would of used these heuristics to fill the blanks between my divided conscious attention. The common misconception in examples like this is you are ‘multitasking’; in fact I am actually dividing my focus of attention between the individual tasks of walking and texting. While consciously focussing on texting I incorporate unconscious heuristics to predict potential future outcomes from my walk, often  successfully. I am, however, playing Russian roulette and eventually something will happen outside my diluted awareness, perhaps in the form of a young boy?

Often these are the conditions that can lead to accidents in dangerous industries. Routine jobs are sometimes the most perilous due to the human operative perception of consequence. If we believe an action has little or no perceived danger we can become wilfully blind to the consequence.

Let me pose some questions – most people would admit to walking and texting, would you  still freely admit to texting while driving? If you do, my next question is would you of considered texting on the drive back from successfully passing your test? The two ingredients I’m alluding to here are consequence and perception. Obviously there are not the same associated consequences with walking and texting as with driving and texting. However, can you agree there is a possible consequence of being hit by a car, if distracted while walking? The second part of this is perception, both of likely danger and also the self-perceived limited ability of a newly qualified driver, colloquially described as ‘self-confidence’. In the realm of the conscious / competence matrix a newly qualified driver would probably be in the conscious competence corner. At this stage the driver will exibit a concentrated focus of attention on the single task of driving safely, once the driver progresses into unconscious competent added tasks will become possible, like conversations and music etc  Herein lies the danger for industries with task repetition. The human operative will logically become unconsciously competent given time, which will develop the possibility of the added capacity to ‘multitask’, and this is often  without incident. The problem only becomes apparent once an added danger is introduced into the equation away from the conscious attention of the worker. In this moment consequence and perception are brought crashing back to earth but often at this point it is too late, not unlike my collision with the young boy.

Distractions can, and should be avoided. An effective toolbox talk that highlights potential lapses in concentration and factors in measures of prevention is key. Understanding the effect of continuous periods of concentration and the onset of fatigue can also be highlighted and prevented at the toolbox talk stage. Proactive task management with awareness of the consequence of perceived routine work and the specific dangers associated with human operatives operating in the unconscious competent quadrant can bring back into the conscious awareness the potential dangers. 

A final thought to ponder? There is a misconception that multitasking is a good thing because of the time saved with concurrent workflow activity. Studies have proven that dividing your attention between tasks actually takes longer than concentrating on each task individually.

Safer and more productive, there’s a thought?      

Living In a Shadow

I have frequently tried, unsuccessfully, to write an article about the Aberfan coal disaster of 1966. Without doubt, its one of the most tragic disasters to recount, and perhaps this is why it is so difficult to write a neutral and balanced article about it? Recently I have finished reading the brilliantly insightful ‘Wilful Blindness’ by Margaret Heffernan, which ‘nudged’ me to finally complete this blog. Throughout the book, without actually referencing Aberfan, there are examples immediately recognisable to the conditions that led to that fateful day in 1966. Aberfan was a disaster so great it scarred a community still felt today and wiped out an entire generation of children. 

There are seminal moments in time that are so significant they scar your memory with your location and what you were doing when you first heard the news. Tragic, or triumphant, they become ingrained in memory. The Twin Towers, or the assassination of JFK. England winning the world cup, or Andy Murray winning Wimbledon, they become psychological watersheds in your timeline; for better or worse. The Aberfan coal disaster is such an event.

For over 50 years the National Coal Board (NCB) deposited millions of cubic metres of colliery waste on Merthyr Mountain above the village of Aberfan. These ‘slag heaps’ lay on porous sandstone rock, which in turn contained multiple natural springs below ground, and streams above. Villagers and miners had expressed their concerns about the natural springs that lay beneath the nearly 800ft high waste tip for years. These concerns were dismissed by the NCB who reassured the local community what they were doing was safe practice. On the morning of 21 October 1966 after days of continuous rain a process called thixotropy occurred beneath the slagheap, this released around 40,000 cubic metres of unwanted coal and rock drenched in rainwater onto the village below. Before reaching the Pentglas School it destroyed 20 houses and a farm. The children of the School were taking part in the morning assembly, while singing ‘All things bright and beautiful’ the rumbling of the fast approaching landslide was heard. On this terrible morning 28 adults and 116 children between the ages of 7 – 10 were killed.

This abhorrent wilful blindness and callous hubris from the NCB management, and in particular it’s Chairman Lord Robens, created a ticking time bomb of unimaginable proportions.

The tragic irony of the wilful blindness exhibited by many involved in the months leading up to the disaster was the transparency of the problem. The dangers were clear for all to see, and furthermore many villagers and miners intuitively knew this practice would sooner or later fail. Transparency is a good thing within any risk managing industry, with transparency comes accountability. Often in the presence these conditions people do the ‘right’ things; without it present the opposite can occur.  There is a paradox of transparency with the Aberfan disaster however. On one hand there can be nothing more openly visible and transparent than an 800ft slack coal heap, lay on springs and clearly marked on OS maps of the area. On the other hand, the information known by the NCB was concealed within the shadows, both before and after the tragedy. Large human factor accidents are rarely the work of criminals, more likely repeated examples of human fallibility and misadventure, or at worst gross incompetence by few. The leadership and management of the NCB came in for scathing criticism during the Davies inquiry and subsequent report, particular blame was attributed to Lord Robens who had shown a complete lack of honesty both before and after the disaster. Amongst the worst acts of dishonesty, Lord Robens denied knowledge of the springs beneath the tip; this infuriated the villagers who knew this not to be true. He also claimed they were not to a contributing factor to the disaster. Lord Robens also staunchly refused to pay the £150,000 needed for the removal of further tips, adding further distress to the grief stricken community. Eventually this bill was paid by the disaster relief fund set up to give financial aid to the village, this would be a heinous wrong that would remain so until the incoming Labour government of Tony Blair, in 1997, instructed the money be paid back. Press intrusion in the aftermath further increased the suffering and distress felt by the villagers who were placed under an intrusive media spotlight. Claims by some of the villagers that a journalist had been heard encouraging a child to cry for her lost friends to enhance the drama of a photograph were appalling, to say the least.

This was contrasted by the public outpouring of sympathy for the grief striken community, which resulted in nearly £1.6 million being raised. To place this into context this would be over £21 million today without the Internet, social media or constant news coverage.

There were many lessons learnt after Aberfan. The Davis Enquiry was rightfully scathing of the management and leadership of the NCB and particularly Lord Robbens. Incredibly, however, Lord Robens kept his job and its perhaps his conduct after the tragedy that draws the most criticism. Most of all there was an incredible lack of transparency displayed by the NCB leadership. Transparency is a wonderfully honest quality, when behaviour is transparent it is usually honest and correct. Even when the behaviours are wrong, they are more often unintentional and can be corrected without serious reprimand. Consider this, can you ever recall getting caught doing something wrong. The instant reaction is to cover up and conceal the truth, human behaviour tells us people don’t conceal or cover up their actions when they’re doing the ‘right’ thing.

I can’t help but wonder that had there been more transparency in 1966 we may have been able to avoid one of the most tragic events of the 20^th century?     

The Cost of Uncertainty

The recent downturn in the price of oil has sent shock waves through the Oil & Gas industry worldwide. The prolonged and steady fall in value since June has left the industry with an end of year price of less than $60 per barrel. There are many ways to look at the cause and effect equation of this, for many countries that import oil this signals good news with the price of fuel tumbling in recent months. In fact any industry that requires fuel to operate should be reaping the fruits of this crude oil tumble in value. The international politics of this current situation is seismic, the UK with than 1.8% of the world production is dually concerned, also it furthermore highlights the precarious wealth enjoyed in Aberdeen – what will the city do after the Oil & Gas is finished? 

If this is the political effect of the drop in value, what is the upstream cost to the safety of those working within this dangerous industry?

When shares tumble companies usually look to streamline operations in various fast and arguably effective ways. Reduce the workforce, stop hiring, and reduce training and development are all viable options to weather the storm.  All of these have produced disastrous safety consequences in the past however, both financially and reputational. There can be no uncertainty; safety and profit should never be confused. Lord Cullen emphasised this in his enquiry after Piper Alpha, and the same charge was given to the Deep Water Horizon platform. NASA has also felt this pain periodically with major shuttle losses within their space program in different decades, both with the same charge - compromising safety because of profit. CEO’s should be under no illusion that the message they give to their executives is resonated through the managers and magnified throughout the installations. This is especially prevalent during a period where the mainstream media appears to be fuelling concern for the future of the industry in the UK. Strong and dynamic leadership is imperative, as many working in this sector will be counselling caution for the forecasted growth uncertain times lay ahead. This uncertainty can be the final component needed to create the conditions required for a big accident. BP felt this pain with their CEO’s confusing ‘every dollar counts’ message, which was the precursor for the Macondo blow out. 

In fact many of the biggest accidents experienced in industry are found in the company of investment cuts and uncertainty.

This current downturn should not be the catalyst for a compromise in safety training; in fact we believe it can have a contribution to the cost effectiveness and profitability long term. Effective Human Factors training has many benefits; the Aviation industry knows this and regardless of fluctuation in share prices all aviation pilots and cabin crew must complete regular Crew Resource Management (CRM) training. Since mandatory CRM training was introduced this industry as seen a huge reduction in near misses and accidents, the upstream effect of this improved profit projections. When this training is applied alongside simple and effective management software the result is a safety culture that understands the human element contributing to accidents. 

There is a secondary gain from a safety culture; a reduction in accidents is an increase in profits. In these challenging times this can only be seen as a positive?  

Straightening The Deck Chairs On The Titanic

It is always preferential to have foresight where possible, as opposed to hindsight. Working today to prevent the accidents of tomorrow seems to be a sensible approach to Human Factors. With this in mind the irony of our blog writing has not escaped us, constantly we find ourselves looking backwards for examples of accidents to use within the articles. Often these examples are very tragic and sometimes difficult to relive, this is also something that does not escape us. This is important because to develop clear foresight requires an occasional touch of hindsight. The past is where our questions wait, and more importantly the answers to these questions lay, we need to shine a light on these shadows to illuminate the lessons.

                                             The crew of Titanic including Cap Smith

The Titanic presents, in our opinion, the single greatest lesson in Human Factors. When examined, nearly every strand of modern Human Factors is present within this single story. The Titanic lesson is so strong it has now become a metaphor for Human Factors.

Recently it was suggested that investment in ‘prevention focused’ training should be measured against the likely occurrence of a ‘big’ event becoming reality. Is it better to surrender to the hand of fate and hope that chance smiles on you (and potentially save money), or invest and prepare for an unlikely reality? This statement mirrors the corporate mentality of the White Star Liner when designing and building the Titanic. Discussing all of the contributing factors into this disastrous trans Atlantic crossing, from design and build to its maiden voyage, could not be achieved in one blog. With that in mind we would like to focus on one particular contributing element; the mindset and attitude of those involved.

Most organisations that have experienced a sizable accident will of held the mindset of ‘it might never happen’. Added to this investment in preventing something that might not actually become a reality is sometimes a difficult expense to swallow. This can create a paradox of planning and training for an unlikely event, hence the title ‘tidying the deck chairs on the Titanic’. The further paradox with this mindset is you can’t measure the accidents you never had!  

Is it better to ‘appear’ you are serious about accident prevention while really focusing on the more immediate and pressing issues associated with operating a large business? Surely as long as there is a measured approach that complies with industry recommendations this is fine, isn’t it?

Perhaps not?

The designers of the Titanic thought they had created an unsinkable ship, this provides the perfect conditions to test such profound humanistic statements. There is a famous saying that nature does not respect the qualifications or the competence of men. This statement can be applied to avalanches in mountaineering, fog and high winds to airline pilots and, as with Titanic, icebergs and ships Captains. Nature does not recognise their competence nor does it spare them when the time of reckoning comes. The Titanic had lifeboat capacity for only half of its passengers, because they presumed it was unsinkable. Recent evidence has surfaced that before departing Southampton a civil servant called Maurice Clarke expressed serious reservations about Titanic’s lifeboat capacity. His superior’s threatened Mr Clarke’s job and the original recommendation of increasing Titanic’s lifeboat fleet by 50% was overruled. Had this come to light during either the British or American enquiry there may have been a stronger case for corporate manslaughter against the White Star Liner?

                                                Computer regeneration of Titanic 

This ‘invincible’ mindset was intoxicating; the passengers believed it, the ships builders believed it and the crew did also. Even immediately after the iceberg struck still many felt safe. Perhaps the most poignant example of this wilful blindness was that of Wireless Officer Phillips. He was responsible for sending and receiving messages on the one radio channel that Titanic had, he chose to prioritise wireless transmissions of the super rich 1^st class passengers over the iceberg warnings. Mr Phillips went down with the ship, sending SOS messages to the end.

                                                 Both parts of Titanic on the sea bed

Although this seems an extreme example from over 100 years ago, do we still exercise this ‘wilful blindness?’ The answer in short is yes, albeit rarely thankfully. We need look no further than the Costa Concordia for a stark reminder of the hubristic inclination of man.  Part of this fallibility is our romance with courting chance, whether in a casino, bungee jumping off a bridge or performing a flamboyant manoeuvre with a large ship.  Human Factors learns the lessons of the past so to implement today for a safer future. Working with risk will always require measuring the consequence against the likelihood; this process helps us plan with foresight. A safety culture embedded within operational excellence allows for a clear and transparent vision for the future. We need only use hindsight once to know that one Titanic is enough.

"Eternal Father, strong to save, whose arm hath bound the restless wave,

Who bids't the mighty ocean deep its own appointed limits keep;

Oh, hear us when we cry to Thee, for those in peril on the sea!"

REMEMBERING OUR LESSONS….

The Challenger Shuttle Disaster 1986

When I was growing up my friend lived an old fashioned cottage, the entrance to his cottage was particularly low and in my opinion ergonomically poorly designed. Every time, without exception, when leaving his cottage I would bang my head on the oak beam above the door. My pal would always laugh and ask me “will you ever remember the door frame?” – “obviously not” would be my predicable sarcastic retort.

Sometimes we have painful lessons, which enable us to draw the necessary knowledge to move forward and develop, personally or professionally.  Occasionally though we are met with such a painful lesson that the learning is etched into the minds of those present. NASA felt this pain with the Challenger disaster in 1986 and the Oil & Gas industry with Piper Alpha in 1988, painful lessons that could not be forgotten easily – but they were forgotten though? When the Columbia Shuttle broke up 16 minutes before landing in February 2003 the ensuing report was highly critical that NASA did not learn from the Rogers Commission, set up in the aftermath of the Challenger disaster. NASA’s disregard for the safety of its Astronauts brought particular criticism, especially once the Commission discovered that NASA had known about the fatal flaw in the rubber O ring seal for the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB) since 1977. Many mistakes were made and many promises were undertaken to ensure space exploration was as safe as viably possible.  In the aftermath of Challenger, the Rogers Commission made specific recommendations to NASA surrounding the governance and management of the space program. In 1996 only 10 years after Challenger NASA returned to old practices to save money much to the dismay of the head of Space Shuttle Program at NASA, Brian O’Connor, who argued at the time:

Columbia Crew 2003

“Its is a safety issue, we’ve ran it this way (with the program management at HQ, as recommended by the Rogers Commission) for 10 years without a mishap and I don’t see any reason why we should go back to the way we operated in the pre-Challenger days.”

O’Connor’s concerns fell onto deaf ears and NASA chose to ignore his outspoken opinion, he felt this left him no other choice than to resign from NASA. Although both accidents are unique from a physical perspective, they are eerily close in managerial errors; this did not go unnoticed by the Columbia Accident Commission which was highly critical of the middle management hubris of NASA. In both examples a fatal flaw to both Shuttles, which was known by NASA, became watered down and a culture of acceptance of risk overtook the desired culture of safety first – without compromise.

Challenger Crew 1986

Deep Water Horizon 2010

It seems that this short term memory is not uniquely preserved for NASA, the Oil & Gas industry have a similar example with Piper Alpha in 1988, and the Deep Water Horizon (Macondo blow out) in 2010. Once again although the physical elements of the disaster have their uniqueness, the human factors bear similar resemblances – specifically with regards to the acceptance of risk in the presence of profit, although NASA's problems lay in the opposite end of the spectrum - maintaining the output with less financial resources.  It is this desensitisation of this risk acceptance, which runs through all 4 examples, in all cases the associated issues that contributed to the final event, became acceptable.

Can an organisation fully commit to a safety first culture while management decisions clearly reflect a profit first mind-set?

What signal, be at the conscious level, or unconscious level, is sent by organisations to the work force?  

My honest belief is no to the first question and the wrong one to the second, and so is Lord Cullen’s who led the enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster.

           

Piper Alpha 1988

The similarities between these 4 catastrophes are striking from a Human Factors perspective. Effective decision making in the aftermath of both Challenger and Piper Alpha were criticised by the respective enquiries, however, it only took 17 years for NASA and 22 years for the Oil & Gas Industry to forget some of the vital lessons learned.

Once again the lessons taken from Columbia and Macondo are raw to those working within these risk related industries. In the immediate aftermath of such events motivation is at it’s most intense to ‘turn the corner and improve safety’. The pain of loss can be viewed as a metaphor for ‘the stick’ in motivation; this represents an organisational ‘away from’ motivational preference. It represents a motivational system which is at it’s most intense after the event - however there is another way to approach safety?

The ‘carrot’ which represents a ‘towards’ motivational preference encompasses an organisation continually moving towards a complete safety culture. Each day, week after week, the organisation works towards a common vision communicated throughout the workforce and embodied by the management.  This avoids the spike in activity, which inevitably follows a significant accident, more over acts as bow wave of activity continually evolving with relentless energy and without pause.

My stick typed lesson when banging my head on my friends door frame eventually became embedded, there was only so many times I seemed prepared to endure the pain associated with my clumsiness. My hope in the future is NASA and other risk related industries do not require persistent 20-year ‘bumps’ on the head.

  

THE TIME FOR DECISION IS NOW, OR IS IT?

Timothy Galloway, in his book ‘The Inner Game of Tennis’, explores the possibility that concentrating too much on a skill has profound negative effects – especially during the coaching phase of skill acquisition.  In short you can concentrate too much creating the conditions of indecision, or paralysis by analysis.

I have often wondered at which point in time is a human decision made? When, and how does a thought transmit into a behaviour, and equally important is a decision without a visible behaviour really a decision.  I once heard a story about the Commanding Officer of the SAS, he would personally interview new young Officers arriving at Hereford, and without exception he would always make the same statement.

“Right decision, well done. Wrong decision, unlucky; learn for next time. No decision, unacceptable!”

I have repeated this story many times when trying to coach someone into becoming decisive and taking action. Indecision is the friend of procrastination, delaying the call for momentum that acts as a precursor for a positive, or even negative, choice.

The question still remains, when does the decision take place, and is deciding to do nothing still a valid decision?

To help answer this interesting suggestion perhaps I could look at the decision making process of a TT motorbike racer, performing thousands of life or death decisions each lap of the infamous Isle of Man TT course. Athletes often describe a Zen like state called ‘flow’, in which everything falls into place without thought. The scientific minded people would ask how do we quantify this ‘flow’ and how do we know when exactly an athlete has it, what is present during flow that is not present without it?  The simplest explanation could be the surrender of the decision making process from the conscious mind to the unconscious mind. If the common hypothesis is true that the conscious brain can process around 7 bits of information (plus or minus 2), at any one time, surely there would be reliance on recruiting other resources needed to deal with incredibly fast processing of the world around at 180 mph. Decisions would need to be made instantaneously, without the benefit of hindsight, and without time for an effective review of the various options available – the right decision, every time, with no second chances.

Ayrton Senna once famously backed of a flying qualification lap; around a blind corner an accident had taken place without his knowledge. Had Senna attacked this flat out corner he would certainly of collided with the wreckage of the car in front, something told him to take is foot of the accelerator in a split second decision?  Somehow Senna had interpreted information outside of his conscious awareness leading him to make this incredible decision – he had effectively listened to his gut feeling! Senna at the time was the biggest star in F1; he was accustomed to all eyes being on him during races and qualification. This corner was different somehow, when the footage was reviewed of Senna’s approach to the corner the thousands of eyes usually looking at Senna were not, they were looking to their right at the crash scene, this piece of information, outside of Senna’s conscious awareness, was enough for him to abort the lap on the strength of a split second feeling inside his gut.

So, if an athletes ‘flow’ is achieved in the surrender of decisions to the unconscious brain could accidents occur when the conscious brain tries to muscle back in on the act? This can be quantified most clearly with footballers taking penalties under extreme pressure. Most missed penalties are a result of indecision that can be observed early in the attempt. Getting ‘caught in two minds’ suddenly becomes an ironic commentators pun. Contrast this 2 minded approach often seen by footballers taking penalties with that of the rugby player Johnny Wilkinson, he makes every aspect of the kick a ritual, almost entering a mild trance in which he can silence all around and hand over the task, in its entirety, to his unconscious mind.

The difference, however, between the decisions of footballers and rugby players should not be compared to TT racers. Richard ‘Milky’ Quayle once said, from his hospital bed after a 150mph crash, that the 37 mile course was incredibly hard mentally and that often he would have to battle to ‘stop his mind wandering’. This wandering of the mind could be the switch backwards and forwards between conscious decision process and unconscious decision process, science would suggest that travelling at 170mph through Kirk Michael village with houses either side added to the almost infinite other pieces of information, represents more than the 7 afforded to our conscious brain?

Science and neuroscience are providing us with some of the most incredibly interesting research on the point in time when a decision is made. Research from the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences suggests that a decision is actually made up to 7 seconds before we are consciously aware, which in and of itself provides ideas and theories to be explored in future blogs.

One thing is for certain though, through heightened awareness comes a heightened reliance on the unconscious mind. Information processing, situational awareness and decision making all require cognitive skill, perhaps there is no greater example of this than the men who average 130mph around a road circuit sandwiched between houses, hedges and stone walls.

Timothy Galloway discovered that rather than over coaching specific details, if he asked his tennis players to think only of bounce – hit, in time with the game, they had incredible results. The surrender of the skill to the unconscious brain allowed them to achieve the ‘flow’ so sought after by athletes.